	· *	Approved For Release 2007/06/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000007-9	. 0514
		TOP SECRET	· 25X1 25X1
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) a 20			٠. ١
IRAN-IRAQ			
Sitrep			•
LDX DCI		Iran-Iraq: Situation Report	
DDCI		Number 27 (As of 0830 EDT 29 July 1982)	•
ExDir	٠.	(AS OF 0830 EDT 29 JULY 1982)	
ExSec	• .		
DDI Mi	litar	y Situation	25 X 1
A DDI	Tr	an last night launched the third phase of its invasion of	•
DDS&T Ira	ag by	attacking Iraqi defenses along the central portion of the	•
Bas	srah	front.	25 X 1.
C/NIC VC/NIC	-		
NIO/W		The attack, which began at dusk last night (local time),	
NIO/NESA		centered around and just north of the area of the Iranian salient. Fighting continued all night and into this	
D/CPAS		morning morning	25 X 11
DD/CPAS C/CSG		Then eleien its form	11
C/OpsCtr		Iran claims its forces overran the first line of Iraqi defenses and crossed a wide minefield.	
C/CIC	. `.	the initial objective of the	. 25X1 ∠5X1
S00		attack was to seize triangular strongpoints that anchor	
SWO WA		Iraq's second line of defense.	25 X 1
NID			25X1
PDB		the Iranian attack by this morning	25X1
D/NESA		had been contained after a penetration of up to 5	05)//
		kilometers. An Iraqi pincer counterattack by two	25 X 1
NIO/GPF		divisions was proceeding well and the Iraqis expected	
DDO/DO(5)!		that the Iranians would be pushed back to their starting point by this afternoon (local time).	· 25 X 1
DDS&T/DO(2)) ·		20,711
ITC FLS		Preliminary analysis	25X1
CRES	,	indicates that the primary battle area is	25 X 1
OCR		obscured by dust, and the battle line cannot be determined. Elsewhere along the Basrah front there is no	•
OGI/Energy		change in the front lines.	25 X 1
CPAS/IMD/CE NESA/PG(2)			20/(1
I-I WG		Comment: Iran's chances of success in this phase of	•
File'		their invasion are slim as long as they insist on using unimaginative heavy infantry assaults head-on against	
		heavily fortified Iraqi defenses backed by armored	
•		reserves. Iran has again chosen to attack along the	
•		central portion of the Basrah front where Iraqi physical	
		defenses are strongest. Plans for the second-prong of the attack along the Shatt probably will not be executed	
		and added along one phase broadply will not be executed	
	•		25 X 1
•			
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•	•		•
•			· •
		TOP SECRET	·25X1
•		Approved For Release 2007/06/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R001604000007-9	

¥F*	Approved For Release 2007/06/29 : CIA-RDP84B00049R0	01604000007-9	25 X 1
		·	25 X 1
3			
	unless forces involved in last night's b able to withstand the strong Iraqi count intelligence had warned Iraqi forces of place and probably the hour of the Irani	erattack. Iraqi the day, the an assault,	05744
	allowing time to plan the counterattack.		25 X 1
,		both sides	· 25X
continu	ue to prepare for chemical warfare.	·	25 X 1
	- Iraqi irregulars were recently issued pr and Iraqi artillery units were ordered t	otective masks o submit	
•	requirements for resupply of chemical eq		25 X 1
	- Iranian units continued to request addit		
	masks because of anticipated Iraqi use o weapons.	f chemical	. 25X1
	 Comment: The Iraqis used tear gas effec ago to break up Iranian infantry assault 	s. Iraqi	
	artillery units probably were resupplied for possible use against Iran's current	with tear gas infantry-led	
			· 25V1